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Abstract
Background: Much remains unknown about the effect of timing and prioritization of vaccination against
pandemic (pH1N1) 2009 virus on health outcomes. We adapted a city-level contact network model to study
different campaigns on influenza morbidity and mortality.
Methods: We modeled different distribution strategies initiated between July and November 2009 using a
compartmental epidemic model that includes age structure and transmission network dynamics. The model represents
the Greater Vancouver Regional District, a major North American city and surrounding suburbs with a population of 2
million, and is parameterized using data from the British Columbia Ministry of Health, published studies, and expert
opinion. Outcomes are expressed as the number of infections and deaths averted due to vaccination.
Results: The model output was consistent with provincial surveillance data. Assuming a basic reproduction number =
1.4, an 8-week vaccination campaign initiated 2 weeks before the epidemic onset reduced morbidity and mortality by
79-91% and 80-87%, respectively, compared to no vaccination. Prioritizing children and parents for vaccination may
have reduced transmission compared to actual practice, but the mortality benefit of this strategy appears highly
sensitive to campaign timing. Modeling the actual late October start date resulted in modest reductions in morbidity
and mortality (13-25% and 16-20%, respectively) with little variation by prioritization scheme.
Conclusion: Delays in vaccine production due to technological or logistical barriers may reduce potential benefits
of vaccination for pandemic influenza, and these temporal effects can outweigh any additional theoretical benefits
from population targeting. Careful modeling may provide decision makers with estimates of these effects before
the epidemic peak to guide production goals and inform policy. Integration of real-time surveillance data with
mathematical models holds the promise of enabling public health planners to optimize the community benefits
from proposed interventions before the pandemic peak.
Background
The emergence of a novel swine-origin influenza A/
H1N1 virus in the spring of 2009 led the WHO to
declare the first influenza pandemic of the 21st century
[1]. In the Canadian province of British Columbia,
Canada it first appeared as a spring-summer wave of
very low intensity, but resurged as a more substantial
and widespread second wave in the fall, as in the rest of
Canada and many other countries worldwide [2,3]. The
commencement of this second wave varied by jurisdic-
tion, likely depending in part upon prior first wave
experience, demographic and environmental factors. In
British Columbia, second wave pandemic H1N1
(pH1N1) activity began slowly in early September 2009,
coinciding with the reconvening of schools and
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universities; increased more abruptly in mid-October;
peaked during the last week of October; and fully
resolved by the end of the calendar year [4]. This stands
in marked contrast with Canada’s usual influenza sea-
son, which typically spans November to April [5].
Characterization of the epidemiology of pH1N1 began
early in the outbreak. One of the striking features of
this novel influenza strain is its association with higher
attack rates in younger individuals, compared to what is
usually observed for seasonal influenza [6-12]. Proposed
explanations for an apparently reduced susceptibility in
older adults include pre-existing immunity due to prior
exposure to related H1N1 strains circulating prior to
1957 [13], accumulated cross-protection derived from
seasonal human H1N1 infection across the lifespan [14],
and/or differences in the contact networks of younger
individuals, who are more highly connected (and hence
more likely to be exposed to pH1N1 early in an epi-
demic) than older individuals [15]. Regardless of the rea-
sons underlying differential vulnerability to infection by
age, this observation has important implications for the
design and implementation of mitigation strategies for
pH1N1 and future pandemic influenza viruses.
Vaccination is an important influenza control measure
and was a key component of many countries’ pandemic
preparedness plans. Production of pH1N1 vaccine began
soon after the pandemic potential of pH1N1 was recog-
nized. However, the early arrival of the second wave of
pH1N1 in many regions of the northern hemisphere,
combined with production delays, resulted in the imple-
mentation of vaccination programs in populations
already experiencing moderate to high incidence of
pH1N1, a sequence of events expected to reduce the
ultimate population impact of immunization. Quantify-
ing this reduction and determining how it might have
been mitigated through alternative dispensing schemes
motivated the modeling effort reported here.
Seasonal influenza vaccination campaigns have histori-
cally targeted those at greatest risk of the severe out-
comes of influenza–notably the very young, the elderly
and individuals of all ages with underlying medical con-
ditions, as well as their close contacts, including health
care workers [5]. It has been suggested that vaccination
of schoolchildren might be a more effective strategy
[16], since younger age groups are responsible for a dis-
proportionate amount of influenza transmission, and
targeting these groups would indirectly protect at-risk
groups [17,18]. Some regions–notably the province of
Ontario–have adopted a universal influenza immuniza-
tion program (UIIP) whereby influenza vaccine is pro-
vided free to all citizens over the age of 6 months [19].
In the case of pH1N1, the misalignment between vac-
cine availability and the onset and peak of the second
pandemic wave in the fall 2009 required prioritization of
vaccine. Greater infection risk and poor outcomes in
younger individuals argued for targeted vaccination of
younger age groups [18]. Conversely, older individuals
were at decreased risk of infection with pH1N1, but
experienced higher rates of severe outcomes, including
mortality [20-22]. This is illustrated in outcome surveil-
lance data from British Columbia for both waves, show-
ing that pH1N1 detection was higher in children, but
both the per-laboratory confirmed case hospitalization
and fatality rates were greatest in older adults, with sub-
stantial increase beginning at age 50. The pH1N1 vac-
cine prioritization schemes adopted by many countries
required a balance of these competing considerations
and ultimately differed from seasonal influenza recom-
mendations as a result of vaccine delay and unique pan-
demic patterns of age-related risk [12,23-26].
Mathematical models of the spread of the pH1N1
virus across the population played a prominent role in
the assessment of the pH1N1 pandemic risk and in the
evaluation and design of intervention and control strate-
gies. During the early stages of the pH1N1 pandemic,
mathematical analyses of the initial data from Mexico
and other countries allowed researchers to estimate the
transmissibility of the pH1N1 virus, as measured by the
basic reproduction number [8,11,27,28]. As the pan-
demic progressed, many modeling studies investigated
the impact of different kinds of containment strategies
like social distancing [29], vaccination [18,28-30], and
the use of antivirals [29,31]. These studies among many
others provided important information to policy makers
and demonstrated the value of mathematical modeling
as a risk assessment tool during the emergence of new
infectious disease agents.
We developed a mathematical model of the transmis-
sion dynamics of the pH1N1 virus in the Greater Van-
couver Regional District (GVRD) to quantify the impact
of vaccination campaign timing in relation to the pan-
demic peak on the projected outcomes of these strate-
gies. Models incorporating age structure and/or
heterogeneity in disease vulnerability have long been
used to investigate issues surrounding immunization,
either with instantaneous vaccinations (e.g. [18,32-34])
or with vaccinations concurrent with the epidemic (e.g.
[35]). In particular such models have been used to
investigate vaccination strategies in combination with
campaign timing, as in [36-38]. Our aim was to develop
a population dynamical model that represents the trans-
mission of pH1N1 influenza in a realistic urban setting.
We therefore incorporated into this model detailed
demographic and behavioural factors that provide the
basis for pandemic transmission dynamics. In particular,
in addition to modeling the age structure of the popula-
tion, we also considered the heterogeneity in the contact
rates between individuals by age to better represent the
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overall contact structure of the population and better
approximate the time course of the epidemic. To para-
meterize our model we used data from the Greater Van-
couver Regional District (GVRD), British Columbia
(BC), Canada. This model was used to assist policy-
makers in evaluating different intervention strategies
throughout the Fall (2009) including the impact of vac-
cination of schoolchildren in addition to the specified
target groups, social distancing, as well as assessing the
likelihood of observing a third wave in the winter of
2010. However, as we discuss below, one should observe
similar outcomes in most urban settings.
Methods
Model overview
We developed a susceptible-infected-recovered (SIR)-type
compartmental model, extended to capture heterogeneity
in age and behaviour, both of which affect contact patterns
between individuals. A complete description of the model
is provided in the Appendix, Additional file 1. The popula-
tion was divided into six compartments representing dif-
ferent disease states: susceptible (S), vaccinated against
pH1N1 (SW), exposed (E), pre-symptomatically infectious
(before clinical infection onset) (A), infectious (either
symptomatic, after clinical infection onset; or asympto-
matic) (I), and immune (M). In an attempt to capture the
social network-type dynamics in a more computationally
tractable manner, the population was stratified by age and
activity level. Activity level groupings correspond to the
average number of contacts that individuals have per
week. Mixing of the different age/activity groups was
obtained from models of the GVRD contact network
[39,40]. Each compartment is comprised of many sub-
compartments for each age and activity level grouping.
We ran the model to investigate the time period from Sep-
tember 1, 2009 until May 31, 2010.
Model parameterization
Epidemiological parameters for pH1N1 were derived
from the published literature and empirical data, with
some assumptions reflecting the nature of influenza
infection (Table 1). For simulations, the baseline trans-
mission parameter values were: basic reproduction num-
ber R0 of 1.4, latent period of 3 days, and infectious
period of 7 days (1 day before clinical infection onset
and 6 days either symptomatic, after clinical infection
onset, or asymptomatic) [21,41]. Demographic and
behavioural data used to derive age-specific average
number of contacts per week was obtained for the
GVRD [39,42].
Initial condition
We set the start time of the epidemic to September 6th,
which corresponds to the start of school in Vancouver.
As of August 31st there had been only a total of 812
laboratory-confirmed cases of pH1N1 influenza since
April of 2009 in British Columbia [48]. We assumed
that the number of actual (currently infected) cases on
September 6th was 100. We then distributed them
through the age and behaviour compartments randomly
with probably weighted by population fraction and con-
tact rate in each compartment. Each result we show in
the following represents the mean of 10000 simulations
starting with different random initial conditions. We
further assume that the rest of the population is com-
pletely susceptible. Although there was pH1N1 activity
in the GVRD in Spring 2009 which would result in
some background immunity, it was quite low, as evi-
denced by numbers of laboratory-confirmed cases and
reported hospitalizations [48]. We therefore assumed
the effect of background immunity was negligible.
Vaccination implementation
The time to administer vaccine across the population
was assumed to be 8 weeks. Vaccine distribution
spanned this roll-out period and resulted in final cover-
age levels in different age groups (described below). For
results shown below, we assumed the daily number of
vaccinations gradually decreased throughout the cam-
paign. However using different vaccination rates gave
quantitatively and qualitatively similar results; see
Appendix, Additional file 1 for details and additional
information. We assumed that there was no intra-group
age prioritization for vaccine distribution among those
who were eligible to receive the vaccine. We assumed a
2-week delay between vaccine receipt and development
of a protective immune response [49].
All individuals receiving vaccine were assumed to have
a reduction in pH1N1 acquisition risk equal to 90%
(modeled as a “leaky vaccine”). Although this number
may seem high at first, studies of both the efficacy and
the effectiveness of the pH1N1 vaccine used in Canada
have shown remarkably high levels of protection
[45,46,50]. In particular, initial studies of seroconversion
and seroprotection rates by the adjuvanted pH1N1 vac-
cine used in Canada showed high levels (>90%) of both
consistently across all age groups [45,46]. Further, a
recent study with over 500 participants in Canada
showed that this vaccine was highly effective at prevent-
ing laboratory-confirmed pH1N1 influenza [50]. The
reported high vaccine protection (effectiveness), gener-
ally over 90%, was maintained across most sensitivity
analyses [50]. These results are supported by a similar
study investigating the effectiveness of a the same vac-
cine in children <10 years of age, which reported statis-
tically significant 100% vaccine effectiveness for a single
dose assuming a 2-week development of protective
immune response [51]. We therefore assumed a baseline
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vaccine efficacy/effectiveness of 0.9 across all age groups.
Although as mentioned here there is strong evidence
that the protection offered by the pH1N1 vaccine predo-
minantly distributed in Canada was extremely high, we
nevertheless also performed extensive sensitivity analyses
of our results and conclusions assuming much lower
values of vaccine protection (see Figures S5 and S6,
Additional file 1).
Vaccination scenarios
We considered four different vaccination strategies. In
the first two and fourth scenarios, the final population
vaccination coverage was approximately 47%, matching
age-standardized estimates of overall pH1N1 vaccine
coverage in the GVRD. However, each of these scenarios
simulated different patterns of vaccine distribution
across age groups. The Actual Coverage (AC) strategy
assumed a vaccine uptake in the different age groups
corresponding to the observed uptake of pH1N1 vaccine
in the GVRD during the Fall vaccination campaign of
2009, which covered an aggregate of 47% of the popula-
tion (BC Centre for Disease Control, personal communi-
cation; see Table 2 for age-specific vaccination
coverage). For the Uniform Coverage (UC) strategy,
final vaccine uptake was set at 47% within each age
group.
Because of heightened interest in prioritization of
demographic groups potentially capable of accelerating
early transmission of influenza [18], we also modeled a
Parents and Children (PC) strategy in which 100% of
children aged 5-17 and their parents (represented by
100% of adults aged 30-39) received the vaccine. No
other members of the population were vaccinated under
this strategy, which had a final population coverage of
only 36% in contrast to the 47% of the first two scenar-
ios, a difference that corresponds to over 230,000 fewer
doses distributed throughout the GVRD.
Finally since the PC strategy has a lower population
coverage than the first two, we formulated a fourth
strategy that combines it with a more general vaccine
distribution to attain a final 47% coverage. In the AC
and UC coverage scenarios described above, 36% popu-
lation coverage is achieved in approximately 38 days.
For this fourth scenario, the parents-and-children/actual
sequence strategy (PC+), we assume that after that point
(38 days) the vaccine is then made available to the
Table 1 Model parameter values
Variable Age
group
Value
(range)
Source
Population size 0-2 63,025 2006 Census [42]
3-4 42,260
5-17 322,670
18-24 203,500
25-54 975,875
55-64 237,795
≥65 271,455
Total 2,116,580
Latent period (days) All 3 (2-4) Tuite et al. 2010 [22]
Initial asymptomatic infectious period (in all infected
individuals) (days)
All 1 Liao et al. 2010 [43]
Total duration of infectiousness (days) All 7 (5-7) Tuite et al. 2010 [22]; De Serres [44]
Basic Reproduction number (R0) All 1.4 (1.2-1.8) Pourbohloul et al. 2009 [27]
Proportion of population with pre-existing immunity ≥55 0.5 Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2009 [13]; Fisman
et al. 2009 [6]
Vaccine efficacy All 0.9 (0.5-1) Product Monograph Arepanrix(tm) H1N1 [45]; Waddington et
al., 2010 [46]
Proportion of infected individuals who self-isolate All 0.1 (0.1-0.6) Assumption
Mortality (per 100,000 infections) 0-2 30 Donaldson et al. 2009 [47]
2-4 27
5-17 11
18-24 12
25-54 30
55-64 65
≥65 980
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general public for the remaining time of the campaign.
We model this using AC coverages scaled down propor-
tionally to make up for the 11% deficit in coverage of
the PC strategy.
To reflect actual pH1N1 response activities in GVRD,
we initiated each of the modeled vaccination programs
on October 26, 2009. For the baseline 8-week campaign
length, vaccination was completed by the end of the
week of December 14, 2009.
Sensitivity analyses
We tested the robustness of projections to model
assumptions by performing sensitivity analyses over
plausible ranges of parameter values. A range of values
for R0, latent period, infectious period, vaccine efficacy,
and vaccination campaign lengths (see Table 1) were
tested in the absence of vaccination (where appropriate)
and in the presence of each of the three vaccination
strategies. For each vaccination strategy, we also tested
the effect of varying the start date of vaccination cam-
paigns under baseline transmission parameter values.
Model outputs were assessed for vaccination campaigns
initiated at the beginning of each week from July 5,
2009, to November 22, 2009. Finally, we also assessed
the impact of using different pH1N1 age-specific mor-
tality profiles on our results.
Results
Baseline case without and with vaccination
Although true pH1N1 infection incidence is difficult to
determine, the recorded spread of pH1N1 through dif-
ferent age groups in the GVRD starting in the early
autumn of 2009 was closely reproduced by the model
using the baseline parameter values for pH1N1 (Figure
1). In particular, the model predicted that the highest
number of infections in the 18-54 age group, followed
by the 5-17, 0-4, and ≥55 age groups (Figure 1d), which
is similar to what was observed within laboratory-con-
firmed reported cases. Further, the model predicted a
peak of pH1N1 activity in Vancouver in early November
and highest age-specific attack rates in the 5-17 age
group, followed by the 18-54, 0-4, and ≥55 age groups
(Figure 2, dashed lines).
Figure 2 shows the impact of simulating the actual
GVRD pH1N1 vaccination campaign to the baseline
model (Actual Coverage strategy initiated October 26,
2009, dashed lines). This intervention reduced the simu-
lated cumulative attack rate from 48.3% to 42.0%, repre-
senting over 120,000 pH1N1 infections prevented in the
Vancouver population. The number of cases prevented
is greatest in the 5-17 year old age group (7625 per
100,000 population), followed by the 18-54 (6011 per
100,000), 0-4 (5824 per 100,000), and ≥55 (4152 per
Table 2 Age-specific coverage levels for the different vaccination scenarios
Vaccination strategy Age group Vaccination coverage (%)
Actual pH1N1 vaccination in the Greater Vancouver Regional District (AC) 0-2 60.0
3-4 60.0
5-17 49.0
18-24 36.1
25-54 41.4
55-64 47.4
≥65, community-dwelling 58.8
≥65, long-term care 58.8
Uniform coverage (UC) All ages 47
Parents and children (PC) 5-17 100
30-39 100
All other ages 0
Parents and children/actual sequence (PC+) 0-2 35.0
3-4 35.0
5-17 100.0
18-24 24.9
25-54 33.8
55-64 27.6
≥65, community-dwelling 34.3
≥65, long-term care 34.3
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100,000) age groups. The fraction of cases prevented is
not equivalent across age groups with this strategy: indi-
viduals aged 0-4 and ≥55 years experience the largest
relative reduction in final attack rate (18% decrease),
while those in the 5-17 age group have the smallest
(10% decrease).
Impact of timing of vaccination campaign on final attack
rates
As expected, earlier implementation of the Actual Cov-
erage strategy resulted in smaller final attack rates (Fig-
ure 3). Initiation of vaccination campaigns in the
presence of moderate levels of circulating pH1N1, but
prior to the epidemic peak, had a modest but detectable
impact on final attack rates. For example, under baseline
assumptions, an 8-week campaign initiated 2 weeks
before epidemic onset (August 24) reduced the attack
rate by approximately 83%; an 8-week campaign
initiated 1 month into the epidemic (October 5) reduced
the attack rate by approximately 47%. Additionally, dis-
tribution of vaccine in a shorter period of time resulted
in a greater reduction in attack rates for a given vaccina-
tion campaign start date.
Transmission and mortality impact of different
vaccination strategies
Under baseline assumptions (i.e., vaccination initiated on
October 26, 2009 with an 8-week campaign), vaccination
of not only parents and children/general population in
sequence (PC+), but also of parents and children (PC)
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Figure 1 Age distribution of reported cases and comparison to model predictions. Population denominators for the given age groups
were derived from 2006 census data for the GVRD [41]. a New infections in September 2009 only, b new infections in October 2009 only, c
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alone were more effective than the actual coverage (AC)
or a uniform coverage (UC) strategy in reducing the
influenza attack rate but each achieved equivalent mor-
tality reduction (see Tables 3 and 4, Figure 4a and 4b,
and Figures S1 and S2, Additional file 1 for additional
values of R0). Comparing the AC, UC PC, and PC+ stra-
tegies for different campaign initiation end times yielded
more complex results. Prior to the start of the fall wave
(August 24, 2009 or earlier), the PC strategy resulted in
lower attack rates and mortality in the protected age
groups (5-17 and 18-54) but higher attack rates and
mortality in the other age groups (0-4 and ≥55) than
either the AC or the UC strategies. The PC+ strategy
yielded lower still attack rates but also the lowest overall
mortality reduction. For campaigns initiated during the
fall wave but prior to the epidemic peak (September 28
and October 26, respectively), the PC and PC+ strategies
were superior in both attack rate and mortality reduc-
tions. During this same time frame the AC strategy was
more successful at reducing attack rates than the UC
strategy, with a minor exception in the 18-54 age group
for which the UC strategy was favorable. This general
trend likely resulted from higher AC coverage in the age
groups with both the highest age-specific attack rates
(5-17 year olds) and the most vulnerable age groups (0-
4 year olds and ≥65). This explanation is supported by
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obtain the actual coverage levels outlined in Table 2. The resulting epidemic curves assume R0 of 1.4, latent period of 3 days, and infectious
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Table 3 Overall and age-specific final attack rates for pH1N1 for different vaccination scenarios for R0 1.4 and an 8-
week vaccine campaign length.
Vaccination start date Vaccination strategy Attack rate,% (% reduction vs. None)
All ages 0-4 5-17 18-54 ≥55
None None 48.3 35.1 78 47.5 24.1
24-Aug AC 8.0 (83) 4.6 (87) 12.0 (85) 8.9 (81) 3.2 (87)
UC 10.1 (79) 6.7 (81) 20.0 (74) 8.8 (81) 4.0 (83)
PC 6.1 (87) 7.8 (78) 1.1 (99) 8.5 (82) 5.0 (79)
PC+ 4.3 (91) 5.0 (86) 0.9 (99) 6.2 (87) 3.2 (87)
28-Sep AC 25.5 (47) 16.0 (54) 42.3 (46) 25.7 (46) 10.9 (55)
UC 26.8 (44) 18.3 (48) 49.2 (37) 24.7 (48) 11.7 (51)
PC 14.1 (71) 14.0 (60) 9.4 (88) 18.3 (62) 9.5 (61)
PC+ 12.1 (75) 12.3 (65) 7.7 (90) 15.9 (67) 8.2 (66)
26-Oct AC 42.0 (13) 28.9 (18) 69.8 (10) 41.1 (13) 19.7 (18)
UC 42.0 (13) 29.8 (15) 71.5 (8) 40.3 (15) 19.9 (17)
PC 37.7 (22) 29.3 (16) 54.1 (31) 39.3 (17) 20.1 (17)
PC+ 36.4 (25) 28.5 (19) 52.0 (33) 38.0 (20) 19.5 (19)
23-Nov AC 47.4 (2) 34.1 (3) 77.1 (1) 46.5 (2) 23.4 (3)
UC 47.4 (2) 34.2 (2) 77.2 (1) 46.4 (2) 23.4 (3)
PC 47.0 (3) 34.4 (2) 75.2 (4) 46.5 (2) 23.6 (2)
PC+ 46.8 (3) 34.3 (2) 74.9 (4) 46.3 (3) 23.5 (2)
Attack rate is defined here as the total number of infections. ‘AC’ indicates the actual vaccination coverage for pH1N1 in the GVRD, ‘UC’ the uniform coverage
vaccination strategy, ‘PC’ the parents and children vaccination strategy, and ‘PC+’ the PC/actual sequence strategy
Table 4 Overall and age-specific pH1N1-attributable mortality for different vaccination scenarios for R0 1.4 and an 8-
week vaccine campaign length.
Vaccination start date Vaccination strategy Mortality per 100,000 population (% reduction vs. None)
All ages 0-4 5-17 18-54 ≥55
None None 29.6 8.6 7.4 10.9 101.1
24-Aug AC 4.1 (86) 1.1 (87) 1.1 (85) 2.1 (81) 12.7 (87)
UC 5.2 (82) 1.6 (81) 1.9 (74) 2.0 (81) 17.1 (83)
PC 5.8 (80) 1.9 (78) 0.1 (99) 1.9 (83) 21.7 (79)
PC+ 3.7 (87) 1.2 (86) 0.1 (99) 1.4 (87) 13.5 (87)
28-Sep AC 13.7 (54) 3.9 (54) 4.0 (46) 6.0 (46) 44.4 (56)
UC 14.9 (50) 4.5 (48) 4.6 (37) 5.7 (48) 49.4 (51)
PC 11.3 (62) 3.4 (60) 0.9 (88) 4.2 (62) 40.5 (60)
PC+ 9.8 (67) 3.0 (65) 0.7 (90) 3.6 (67) 35.1 (65)
26-Oct AC 24.4 (18) 7.1 (18) 6.6 (10) 9.5 (13) 81.7 (19)
UC 24.8 (16) 7.3 (15) 6.7 (8) 9.3 (15) 83.8 (17)
PC 24.5 (17) 7.2 (16) 5.1 (31) 9.0 (18) 84.6 (16)
PC+ 23.7 (20) 7.0 (19) 4.9 (33) 8.7 (20) 82.0 (19)
23-Nov AC 28.7 (3) 8.4 (3) 7.3 (1) 10.7 (2) 97.9 (3)
UC 28.8 (3) 8.4 (2) 7.3 (1) 10.7 (2) 98.2 (3)
PC 29.0 (2) 8.5 (2) 7.1 (4) 10.7 (2) 99.2 (2)
PC+ 28.9 (2) 8.4 (2) 7.1 (4) 10.7 (3) 98.8 (2)
Attack rate is defined here as the total number of infections. ‘AC’ indicates the actual vaccination coverage for pH1N1 in the GVRD, ‘UC’ the uniform coverage
vaccination strategy, ‘UC’ the uniform coverage vaccination strategy, ‘PC’ the parents and children vaccination strategy, and ‘PC+’ the PC/actual sequence
strategy
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the overall success, in both attack rate reduction and
mortality reduction, of the PC+ strategy: as with the PC
strategy, the age group with highest age-specific attack
rates is completely protected, but there is also limited
protection for the most vulnerable age groups. There
were no substantive differences in the outcomes of all
vaccination strategies (AC, UC, PC, or PC+) when the
campaigns were initiated well after the epidemic peak
(on November 23).
These results are especially notable because of the dif-
ference in the overall coverage between the strategies:
47% for the AC, UC, and PC+ strategies vs 36% for the
PC strategy. Similar results were observed for pandemic
viruses exhibiting less transmissibility than pH1N1 (e.g.,
R0 = 1.2) (see Figures S1 and S2, Additional file 1 and
Tables S1-S6, Additional file 1 for additional values of
R0), assuming different reported age-specific mortality
profiles (see Figure S3, Additional file 1), and consider-
ing only the PC strategy assuming lower coverage levels
in the parents and children groups (see Figure S4, Addi-
tional file 1).
Vaccine efficacy
We evaluated the interplay between pH1N1 vaccine effi-
cacy and the timing of the vaccination campaign for the
Actual Coverage strategy (Figure 5, see Figure S5, Addi-
tional file 1 for sensitivity of cumulative attack rate to
vaccine efficacy). If the simulated campaign begins well
before the onset of the epidemic, vaccine efficacy was
observed to have an important impact on depleting the
size of the susceptible population and consequently
reducing the outbreak size. For a vaccine with 85% or
95% efficacy, for example, the percent reduction in final
attack rate relative to that observed in the absence of
vaccination was 85% or 92%, respectively. However, for
vaccination campaigns initiated after the onset of the
epidemic, reductions in final attack rates were not highly
sensitive to vaccine efficacy. For example, when vaccina-
tions were implemented late in the epidemic stage
(October or November) the percent reduction in final
attack rate varied only slightly when vaccine efficacy
increased from 50% to 100% (almost vertical lines repre-
senting the 5% and 15% contours in Figure 5). We
observed similar patterns for other coverage scenarios
(see Figure S6, Additional file 1).
Sensitivity of results to transmission parameters for
pH1N1
Varying epidemiological parameters changed the
cumulative attack rate in the presence of the Actual
Coverage strategy in predictable ways. This is clear
from Figure 6 (see Figure S7, Additional file 1 for
results in the absence of vaccination), where we show
a sensitivity analysis on the cumulative attack rate for
a given R0. To generate the shaded areas, we ran simu-
lations for parameter combinations from the ranges
given in Table 1 with each combination given equal
wait. We observed in particular that the lengths of
shortening the infectious and latent periods resulted in
more rapid epidemic growth and larger final outbreak
sizes for a given value of R0, due to the shorter win-
dow of opportunity for vaccination to have an effect.
Lengthening these parameters had the opposite effect.
The sensitivity of final attack rates to the latent and
infectious periods diminished as transmissibility (repre-
sented by R0) increased.
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Discussion
Using detailed demographic information for the GVRD,
we have developed a compartmental mathematical
model to estimate the transmission of pH1N1 in this
population and to examine the impact of timing and
age-specific coverage of different vaccination strategies
for reducing the disease burden of pH1N1. Our simula-
tions and sensitivity analyses uncovered findings with
significant public health implications. First, we
quantified the effect of delay in vaccine distribution rela-
tive to levels of pandemic influenza virus circulation in
the population. Although vaccination is a well-estab-
lished influenza preventive measure, we showed that its
effectiveness during a pandemic depends greatly on the
capacity to produce, distribute, and dispense vaccine in
a timely manner. We demonstrated as well the impor-
tance of considering the interplay between vaccine cam-
paign timing, demographics (especially age-specific
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Figure 5 Effect of vaccination campaign start date and vaccine efficacy on overall attack rates. For a given vaccination campaign start
date, the percent reduction in final attack rate relative to that observed in the absence of vaccination is presented for vaccine efficacy of
between 50% and 100%. The ranges of the percent reduction in attack rates are indicated by solid lines and labeled. Vaccination campaigns
were implemented weekly, starting July 5, 2009, with the last campaign started November 22, 2009. The start of the Vancouver influenza season
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contact rates), and the epidemiologic characteristics of
the disease when developing vaccination strategies. Our
sensitivity analyses verified the robustness of the results
reported herein, despite the necessary inclusion of para-
meters in our model for which accurate estimates are
currently non-existent.
We included population activity levels in our mathe-
matical model based on a realistic representation of the
contact network in the GVRD. We believe that this sub-
stantially improves the realism of the model, and gives
us greater confidence in our results. For example, cer-
tain small subpopulations (e.g. health care workers or
children) can have a large number of potentially disease-
transmitting contacts per week, and are therefore more
likely to acquire and transmit infection. Our model cap-
tures this important effect, while simplified models with
homogenized activity levels would not. Age groupings
addressed age-related variations in pH1N1 vulnerability
to infection versus severe outcomes (mortality) each of
which may constitute competing goals of the influenza
immunization program. For example, vaccinating chil-
dren, who tend to have higher contact rates than others,
could result in a lower overall attack rate. However, as
our results for the early initiation of the PC scenario
showed, this strategy could leave the elderly (who
experience higher mortality) relatively unprotected, thus
increasing overall mortality.
In this study we included both symptomatic and
asymptomatic infections in estimates of the overall
attack rate. There are various estimates of the ratio of
asymptomatic to symptomatic influenza cases in the lit-
erature [52,53]. More research should be directed
towards conducting large-scale seroprevalence studies
around the globe to reach a consensus on a plausible
range corresponding to this ratio for pH1N1. When
symptomatically infected, individuals may change their
behaviour, deciding to stay home or cancel appoint-
ments, resulting in a reduction in their social contacts.
Meanwhile, asymptomatically infected individuals may
not observe such stringent self-isolation procedures but
may also be less contagious owing to fewer projectile
symptoms (i.e. coughing or sneezing). This effect was
taken into account in the model and the related para-
meters were varied during sensitivity analyses. Similarly,
other parameters that lack definitive parameterization in
the public health literature (e.g., latent period, infectious
periods) were included in the sensitivity analyses, to
ensure the robustness of the reported results.
We assumed that during the herald wave in spring
and early summer 2009, a relatively small fraction of the
population was infected by pH1N1 symptomatically or
asymptomatically. This assumption was supported by
the marked difference in influenza activity in the pro-
vince of BC between the two periods of April to August
and September to December, based on both laboratory-
confirmed cases and physicians’ visit counts (see Figure
S8, Additional file 1). This pattern is in contrast with
the attack rate reported in other geographic areas, such
as England [43,44,47], where sizable pH1N1 activity was
observed in June and July. In the latter case, before
comparing various immunization strategies, adjustments
should be made to the assumption on the number of
remaining susceptible individuals at the beginning of the
second wave.
We demonstrated that while vaccine efficacy is an
important factor in the outcome of vaccination before
or during the early stages of an epidemic, its impact on
the overall attack rate diminishes significantly when the
start of the campaign approaches or passes the epidemic
peak-time. Simulation results suggest that when vaccina-
tion begins near the peak of the epidemic, a 50% effica-
cious vaccine may reduce the overall attack rate by only
5% less than a 100% efficacious vaccine. This result,
along with our findings about the importance of vacci-
nation timing, confirm the nostrum that no matter how
effective a vaccine may be in theory, it must be adminis-
tered in a timely fashion to have an effect on individual
or herd immune protection.
True pH1N1 infection incidence is difficult to deter-
mine, as many cases go unreported, and an unknown
fraction of pH1N1 cases are asymptomatic. To support
our claim that our model predictions are consistent with
the epidemic, we compared the age-distribution of
reported, laboratory-confirmed pH1N1 cases in the
GVRD (data from the BCCDC Laboratory and BC Min-
istry of Health) with the age distribution of infections
predicted by our model (Figure 1). We found reasonable
agreement between model predictions and reported
cases in age-related trends.
Our results support, to a degree, the growing model-
ing literature claiming that the choice of vaccination
strategy can have a substantial impact on the overall
attack rate of pandemic influenza. This literature largely
relies on careful, detailed modeling of age structure and/
or disease vulnerability levels (e.g. [32], and more
recently [33,38]). The novelty we bring into this growing
body of research is the incorporation of contact struc-
ture, in addition to age structure, as derived from the
underlying GVRD contact network model. However, as
in [37], these results also highlight the relatively greater
importance of vaccination campaign timing and speed
than prioritization scheme before or during the initial
phase of an epidemic. Importantly, our model predicts a
general equivalence of different prioritization schemes
when vaccination begins at or beyond the epidemic
peak.
Our results suggest that there can be two “best” tar-
geting strategies: best given the specific vaccination
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campaign start time relative to the epidemic peak, and
best overall given ignorance of the occurrence time of
the epidemic peak (cf. Figure 4). Optimizing targeting
strategies according to timing, age and disease vulner-
ability were carefully discussed in [18,34-36]. We leave
the corresponding difficult optimization calculation
using our model–which again, in contrast to previous
work incorporates contact structure in addition to age
structure–for future work. However we should comment
that the PC strategy was chosen for comparison with the
optimal strategy proposed in [18]; in there the PC strat-
egy, when applied before the initiation of the epidemic,
is the best choice in terms of both attack rate and mor-
tality reduction. That our predictions differ may be in
part due to the difference in assumptions on vaccine
efficacy: while we assume equal efficacy across all age
groups, Medlock et al. [18] assume that vaccines offer
lesser protection in the elderly population, the popula-
tion with the highest case mortality rates.
It should be noted that we assumed 100% coverage in
our parents and children and parents and children/
actual sequence scenarios, which may be unrealistically
high. We acknowledge that this exaggerates the appar-
ent superiority of this approach, relative to the other
strategies. However this strategy has a lower overall cov-
erage (36%) than the actual coverage or uniform cover-
age strategies (47%). Given the success of the PC
strategy in spite of its lower overall coverage, our results
therefore suggest that, for campaigns initiated before the
epidemic peak, it would be worthwhile for policy-makers
to consider age-based vaccine targeting strategies
assuming that high coverage rates are achievable in the
targeted groups. The improvements in attack rate and
mortality reduction offered by the PC+ strategy, at equal
coverage to AC and UC, strengthen this suggestion.
In addition, it should be noted that our results apply
to the pandemic scenario where a shift in the age distri-
bution toward greater morbidity and mortality in
younger age groups is a recognized hallmark compared
to seasonal influenza [14]. Our results of superior reduc-
tion in mortality with the PC strategy administered dur-
ing the early rise in a pandemic wave may not apply
during seasonal campaigns when attack rates are much
lower and thus population mortality due to influenza is
much lower for children and adults but higher for the
elderly, who remain at intrinsically higher risk of severe
influenza outcomes if infected.
Conclusion
In circumstances in which vaccine production is delayed
due to technological or logistical barriers, as seen with
the pH1N1 vaccine, it is critical to have a good estimate
of the timing of the epidemic peak before making policy
decisions on vaccination strategies. Careful modeling
may provide decision makers with estimates of these
effects before the epidemic peak to motivate production
efficiencies and inform policy decisions. Integration of
real-time surveillance data with mathematical models is
paramount to detect early upswings in illness activity
heralding an epidemic peak and to enable public health
to optimize the community benefits from proposed
interventions before that occurs.
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